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ABSTRACT. We use the Business Roundtable’s challenge to the 
SEC’s 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure 
the value of shareholder proxy access.  We find that firms that 
would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by 
institutional ownership and activist institutional ownership in 
particular, lost value on October 4, 2010, when the SEC 
unexpectedly announced that it would delay implementation of the 
Rule in response to the Business Roundtable challenge. We also 
examine intra-day returns and find that the value loss occurred just 
after the SEC’s announcement on October 4. We find similar 
results on July 22, 2011, when the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of 
the Business Roundtable.  These findings are consistent with the 
view that financial markets placed a positive value on shareholder 
access, as implemented in the SEC’s 2010 Rule. 
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Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value?  Evidence from 
the Business Roundtable Challenge 
 
Shareholder access to the company’s proxy statement has been one of the most heated – 
if not the most heated – topics in corporate governance over the past decade.
1  Opponents of 
proxy access argue that it would shift a dangerous amount of power to certain kinds of 
shareholders (for example, union pension funds) who could pursue objectives counter to 
shareholder value maximization (e.g., Bainbridge 2003).  They also argue that high-quality 
directors may be less willing to serve on boards if they must face competition from shareholder-
sponsored candidates (e.g., Lipton and Rosenblum 2003).  Proponents of shareholder access 
argue that competition in the director election process is desirable, and that giving institutional 
investors more influence in the director election process will likely benefit all shareholders 
(Bebchuk 2003, Bebchuk and Hirst 2010). 
We use the Business Roundtable’s challenge to the proxy access rule as a natural 
experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access.  On August 25, 2010, under 
authority provided by Section 971 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, the SEC enacted a shareholder proxy access rule (the “Rule”).  This Rule was 
intended to go into effect on November 15, 2010.  On September 29, however, the Business 
Roundtable filed a petition in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the new Rule, 
alleging that it was arbitrary and capricious, exceeded the SEC’s authority, and would reduce 
overall shareholder wealth.  In a move that surprised most observers, on October 4 the SEC 
announced that it would delay implementation of the new Rule until the Business Roundtable 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Business Roundtable and U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, 
Complaint filed Sept. 29, 2010 at 2 (“Few issues in corporate governance have generated more disagreement or 
stronger passions.”). 3 
 
challenge was resolved.  On July 22, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck 
down the Rule under the Administrative Procedure Act, accepting the Business Roundtable’s 
argument that the SEC was insufficiently deliberate and rational in adopting the Rule.  In 
September 2011, the SEC announced that it would not appeal the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, but rather 
would permit shareholders to pursue access on a company-by-company basis. 
The Business Roundtable’s challenge to the SEC’s proxy access rule provides the basis 
for an event study.  If shareholder access increases shareholder value, then companies that would 
have been most exposed to the new Rule should decline in value, relative to companies that 
would have been more insulated from the Rule, in response to the SEC’s unexpected stay on 
proxy access (October 4, 2010) and the (arguably) unexpected decision by the D.C. Circuit to 
invalidate proxy access (July 22, 2011).  If instead shareholder access decreases shareholder 
value, then companies that would have been most exposed to the Rule should increase in value, 
relative to those what would have been more insulated, on these dates.  This natural experiment 
allows a rough quantification of the value of shareholder proxy access.  In addition, the 
experiment allows testing of hypotheses about board influence.  If there is heterogeneity across 
firms in the value of shareholder influence through the board of directors, or across different 
types of shareholders in their ability to improve the value of firms, our natural experiment 
provides an opportunity to quantify those differences. 
We use measures of institutional ownership, and activist institutional ownership
2 in 
particular, as a proxy for vulnerability to the Rule.  Using a 1-day event window around October 
                                                 
2 By activist hedge fund, we refer to hedge funds with a history of corporate activism and intervention (see 
Greenwood and Schor 2009 and Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 2008). We discuss the motivation for this in 
more detail below. 4 
 
4, 2010,
3 we find that share prices of companies that would have been most vulnerable to the 
Rule declined significantly compared to share prices of companies that would have been most 
insulated from the Rule.   Specifically, we find a 44 basis point spread between firms with high 
institutional ownership and firms with low institutional ownership for that day’s returns. The 
pattern of lower returns for firms with higher institutional ownership holds true for equal-
weighted excess return portfolios (37 basis point differential), as well as portfolios based on 
activist ownership (43 basis point differential). All three of these estimates are statistically 
significant. In a regression setting, we confirm that institutional ownership, and especially 
activist institutional ownership, was correlated with negative returns on October 4.  For July 22, 
2011, we find results that are directionally similar to the October 4, 2010 results, slightly smaller 
in magnitude and statistically significant.  Taken as a whole, these findings are consistent with 
the view that financial markets placed a positive value on shareholder access, as implemented in 
the SEC’s August 2010 Rule. Presumably, the stock market perceived the stay as a reduced 
likelihood of proxy access in the short run as well as in the long run, perhaps seeing the stay as 
indication of the SEC’s own perception of their ability to defend the rule in court. 
We also use intra-day data on October 4 to determine whether our overall results can be 
attributed to shareholder proxy access.  We find that virtually all of the observed activist effect 
comes after the 12:21 pm announcement of the SEC stay – a period during which the overall 
market hardly moved.   The value loss in activist-held firms appears to have accelerated 
substantially after a Bloomberg news story about the SEC stay appeared at 3:20 pm. These intra-
day results suggest that the relative drop in the market value of equity for firms with large 
                                                 
3 Using a one-day event window to study proxy access is tantamount to focusing on the market’s short term view of 
the announcement’s value effect. Unfortunately, the event study methodology is much less suitable for identifying 
the market’s long-term views (since long term stock returns are more variable than short term stock returns). 5 
 
activist ownership can be attributed to the SEC’s announcement delaying shareholder proxy 
access.
4 
The paper proceeds in six sections.  Section 1 summarizes the evolution of shareholder 
access in the U.S.  Section 2 reviews the existing related literature on proxy access and corporate 
governance more generally.  Section 3 explains our empirical strategy.  Section 4 describes our 
data and methodology.  Section 5 presents our results, and Section 6 discusses potential 
interpretations. Section 7 concludes. 
 
1. Background: Proxy access and boards of directors in the United States  
The corporate law of every U.S. jurisdiction requires that corporations hold an annual 
meeting to elect directors.  In this election, the company will invariably nominate exactly the 
number of candidates to fill the available seats – for example, seven candidates for seven seats.   
Shareholders of the corporation have the right to nominate their own candidates to the board.  
Any shareholder can propose a nominee to the board’s nominating committee, but if the board 
refuses to put the shareholder’s candidate on the company’s slate (which is by far the more 
common outcome), the shareholder would have to engage in a time-consuming and expensive 
process in order to get their candidate seated.  Specifically, a shareholder who wants to nominate 
one or more candidates would have to file Schedule 14A with the SEC, hire a proxy solicitor, 
and often engage in an expensive public campaign to support their nominee or nominees.  These 
                                                 
4 The intra-day findings respond to critics of an earlier version of our paper, who expressed skepticism about the 
validity of event study methodology in general and the causal inferences that can be drawn from such a 
methodology. See, e.g., David Marcus, The Proxy Access Problem, THE DEAL (Nov. 24, 2010) (“[R]eaders with 
little understanding of and less confidence in the black art of regression analysis may well be skeptical of a paper 
that claims to be able to assign a value measured in basis points to a single amorphous factor on a single trading day 
among the dozens that affect the value of stocks.”). 6 
 
expenses are only reimbursed if the shareholder gains control of the board.
5  Moreover, the 
shareholder must share the benefits of any improvement in corporate performance pro rata with 
the other shareholders.  As a result of these obstacles, contested director elections outside the 
context of a hostile takeover bid have been exceedingly rare in corporate America  (Bebchuk 
2003).
6 
Against this backdrop, many commentators have viewed shareholder access to the 
company’s proxy statement as an essential step to make director elections more meaningful, and, 
by extension, to improve overall corporate governance.  After decades of discussion,
7 and not 
coincidentally in the wake of corporate scandals at Enron, Worldcom, and other large U.S. public 
companies, the SEC proposed a shareholder access rule in October 2003.  Under the 2003 rule, 
shareholders would gain the right to place one or more nominees on the company’s proxy 
statement after one of two trigger events had occurred: (1) “withhold” votes of more than 35% of 
votes had been cast for one or more directors; or (2) a majority vote for a 14a-8 shareholder 
access proposal, proposed by a shareholder or shareholder group that had held at least 1% of the 
company’s shares for at least one year.   The Business Roundtable and other groups representing 
director and management interests engaged in a lobbying effort against the proposed Rule.  By 
early 2005, the SEC issued a series of no-action letters permitting companies to omit shareholder 
proposals based on the proposed rule, effectively withdrawing its proposal. 
                                                 
5 For the classic statement of this rule, see Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E. 2d 291 (N.Y. 
1955) 
6 In July 2007, the SEC promulgated its long-awaited “eProxy Rules,” which allow insurgents to post their proxy 
materials on-line and simply mail shareholders a “Notice of Internet Availability of Proxy Materials.”   In theory, 
eProxy rules should reduce the costs of proxy solicitation and increase the number of contested director elections.  
However, the early empirical evidence suggests that the number of contested director elections did not increase 
substantially in the 2009 or 2010 proxy seasons. 
7 See Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,029 n. 73 (June 18, 2009) (noting that the Commission first considered 
proxy access in 1942). 7 
 
In 2006, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME) submitted a shareholder proposal to American International Group (AIG) to amend 
AIG’s bylaws so that a 3% shareholder could place one nominee in AIG’s proxy materials – in 
effect, trying to do at AIG what the SEC’s proposed Rule 14a-11 had tried to do more generally.  
Surprising many commentators, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that this proposal was 
not excludable under the Rule 14a-8(i)(8) exclusion, which at the time permitted companies to 
exclude proposals “relat[ing] to an election for membership on the company’s board of 
directors.”  The court found that the proposal related to board elections broadly, and not to “an 
election” of directors.
8  The holding seemed to open up the possibility of proxy access on a 
company-by-company basis.  But in December 2007, the SEC amended the Rule 14a-8(i)(8) 
exclusion to permit corporations to exclude proposals “relating to an election for membership on 
the company’s board” or relating to “a procedure for such nomination or election.”  This 
amendment was intended to reverse the Second Circuit’s holding in AFSCME v. AIG. 
Shareholder proxy access remained dormant until May 2009, when the SEC returned to 
the issue with a new shareholder access proposal.  The SEC explained: “The nation and the 
markets have recently experienced, and remain in the midst of, one of the most serious crises of 
the past century.  This crisis has led many to raise serious concerns about the accountability and 
responsiveness of some companies and boards of directors to the interests of shareholders, and 
has resulted in a loss of investor confidence.”
9  Under the proposed Rule 14a-11, a shareholder or 
shareholder group that owned more than 1% of a large U.S. public company (defined as market 
capitalization greater than $700 million), more than 3% of a midsize public company (market 
capitalization $75-$700 million), or more than 5% of a small public company (market 
                                                 
8 AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121 (2
nd Cir. 2006). 
9 Securities and Exchange Commission Proposed Rule Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (June 10, 
2009). 8 
 
capitalization less than $75 million) would have the ability to place nominees on the company’s 
proxy statement for up to one-quarter of the total board seats. 
In an effort to preempt or at least shape the SEC’s consideration of shareholder access, 
Delaware amended its corporate code to confirm that shareholders could amend the company’s 
bylaws to permit proxy access.  Section 112 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, enacted 
in May 2009, provides that: “The bylaws may provide that if the corporation solicits proxies with 
respect to an election of directors, it may be required . . . to include in its proxy solicitation 
materials . . . 1 or more individuals nominated by a stockholder.”  Section 112 reflects one 
application of the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in CA v. AFSCME,
10 handed down in July 
2008, which permits shareholders to regulate procedural aspects of corporate governance (e.g., 
how decisions are made) but not substantive aspects, which are left to the board.  Thus Section 
112 confirmed the shareholders’ right to opt-in to proxy access (a so-called “voluntary proxy 
access regime”).  
In July 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act.  Notwithstanding Delaware’s efforts to preempt federal action, 
Section 971 of the Act amended Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act to provide the SEC 
explicit authority to adopt proxy access rules.  By confirming that the SEC had the authority to 
issue shareholder access rules and signaling Congress’s support for such rules, Section 971 made 
shareholder proxy access inevitable, according to most observers. 
On August 25, 2010, by a 3-2 vote, the SEC announced the adoption of a final Rule 14a-
11, mandating proxy access at all U.S. public companies.  Any shareholder or shareholder group 
that held more than 3% of a U.S. public company’s shares for more than three years would be 
eligible to nominate candidates for up to 25% of the company’s board seats.   The new Rule 14a-
                                                 
10 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 9 
 
11 was planned to go in to effect on November 15, 2010, well in time for the April/May 2011 
proxy season.
11 
On September 29, the Business Roundtable, along with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
filed a complaint in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, alleging that the SEC’s proxy access rules 
were unlawful under U.S. securities laws and “arbitrary and capricious.”
12  The Business 
Roundtable complaint also asserted – but did not explain – that the SEC’s proxy rules “do not 
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”
13  The complaint was widely-
anticipated by the marketplace based on public statements, including in the comment letters 
submitted by these two groups to the SEC on the proxy access proposal.  Nevertheless, 
Congress’s authorization to the SEC under Section 971 of the Dodd-Frank was intended to 
largely shut down this kind of challenge; perhaps as a result, the filing of the Business 
Roundtable complaint did not attract significant media attention. 
However, on October 4, the SEC unexpectedly announced that it would stay 
implementation of Rule 14a-11, pending resolution of the Business Roundtable litigation in the 
D.C. Circuit.  The SEC explained: “Among other things, a stay avoids potentially unnecessary 
costs, regulatory uncertainty, and disruption that could occur if the rules were to become 
effective during the pendency of a challenge to their validity.”
14  News accounts noted that the 
                                                 
11 The three year rule excluded many investors with shorter holding periods. However, the rule would have allowed 
investors with two year holdings, for example, to qualify relatively soon. Cella (2011) shows that activist investors 
have longer holding periods than other investors in the US. 
12 For ease of exposition we refer to this litigation as the “Business Roundtable complaint” or the “Business 
Roundtable challenge” hereinafter. 
13 Business Roundtable and U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Complaint 
filed Sept. 29, 2010 at 2. 
14 In the Matter of the Motion of the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce for Stay of Effect of 
Commission’s Facilitating Shareholder Director Nomination Rules, File No. S7-10-09 (Oct. 4, 2010). 10 
 
SEC’s announcement was a surprise.
15  Commentators also noted that the SEC’s stay meant that 
proxy access rules would not go into effect for the 2011 proxy season.
16   
On July 22, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down Rule 14a-
11 under the Administrative Procedure Act.  The D.C. Circuit accepted the Business 
Roundtable’s argument that the SEC’s process in considering and adopting the new Rule was 
insufficiently deliberate and rational.
17   
In September 2011, the SEC announced that it would not appeal the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, 
but instead would re-instate its amendments to Rule 14a-8, which would allow shareholders to 
vote on a resolution recommending or requiring the inclusion of shareholder-sponsored board 
candidaets in the next year’s corporate proxy statement.  The SEC thus moved away from 
comprehensive proxy access to a two-step, company-by-company approach.  Shareholders at 
several major companies, including Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Hewlett-Packard, Sprint 
Nextel, and Wells Fargo, have proposed proxy access resolutions for the 2012 proxy season.
18   
 
2. Literature 
The delegation of control over firms to professional managers is a defining feature of 
modern capitalism (see Berle and Means 1932), and one that raises the possibility of agency 
problems.  Estimating the economic impact of boards and board structure on shareholder wealth 
has been difficult because of econometric identification challenges.  Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998) point out that one reason that much of the corporate governance literature finds weak 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz memorandum to clients (Oct. 5, 2010), SEC Stays Shareholder Access – 
For Now (noting “unexpected development”). 
16 See, e.g., Wachtell memo (Oct. 5, 2010); Jesse Westbrook, SEC Delays Proxy-Access Rules Amid Legal 
Challenge, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2010). 
17 Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).   
18 Jason Zweig, Will New Tools Help Small Shareholders Topple Giants?, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 7, 2012). 11 
 
correlations between board characteristics and firm performance may be that board 
characteristics are endogenous, i.e. across firms, board characteristics are likely not assigned at 
random.  This makes the effect of any board characteristic (e.g., the presence of outsiders, the 
number of directors) impossible to identify based only on the observed correlation between that 
characteristic and firm performance.  
Shareholder access to the company’s proxy statement is one specific dimension of 
corporate governance that has been heavily debated over the years.  As an illustration, more than 
700 different comment letters were submitted to the SEC when proxy access was proposed in 
2003; more than 200 different comment letters were submitted during the 2007 rulemaking 
process; and more than 500 different comment letters were submitted when proxy access was 
proposed again in 2009.  Proponents of shareholder access (e.g., Bebchuk 2003, Bebchuk and 
Hirst 2010) point out that proxy contests under the existing regime are exceedingly rare, and 
argue that a meaningful director election process would improve corporate governance.   
Opponents of shareholder access argue that shareholders already have sufficient voice in the 
election of directors (e.g., Bainbridge 2010), that shareholder access rules would likely shift too 
much power to shareholders or shareholders with specific agendas, and that high-quality 
directors may be less willing to serve on boards if they must face competition from shareholder-
sponsored candidates (e.g., Lipton and Rosenblum 2003).
19  A third set of commentators object 
to the “one-size-fits-all” approach of mandatory shareholder access (e.g., Grundfest 2009).  
These commentators propose that shareholders should be able to opt-in, or at least opt-out, of the 
SEC’s proxy access rules.   
                                                 
19 This argument is related to the idea proposed by Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) that closer oversight may 
weaken managerial incentives. Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that management-friendly boards are sometimes 
optimal because they pose a weaker monitoring threat, which enables them to solicit more information from CEOs. 12 
 
A recent theory paper by Harris and Raviv (2010) addresses the optimal extent of control 
to place in the hands of shareholders versus managers.  Their model includes strategic 
communication between self-interested and potentially privately informed managers and 
shareholders as well as delegation.  Harris and Raviv find that when shareholders seek to 
maximize firm value and are not misinformed, it is optimal to place the delegation decision in 
the hands of shareholders, allowing them to decide ex ante which decisions to leave to 
management and which to make directly.  Owners will then delegate decisions where 
management’s information advantage outweighs its agency costs to managers.  The authors view 
this result as being consistent with Bebchuk’s (2005) recommendation to allow shareholders to 
set the “rules of the game” regarding decision power and corporate governance. 
A recent paper by Kahan and Rock (2011) argues that proxy access would be unlikely to 
yield a significant number of shareholder-nominated candidates, and would be unlikely to have a 
meaningful effect on corporate governance more generally.  Drawing inferences from past 
behavior, the authors argue that neither mutual funds nor private pension funds would make 
significant use of shareholder access.  Large public pension funds “may make some 
nominations,” but hedge funds and union-affiliated funds, which historically have been more 
activist, would generally not satisfy the ownership and holding period requirements under the 
Rule.  In addition, Kahan and Rock argue that the proxy access rule would not substantially 
lower the costs of running a short slate contest, and that, in some respects, the costs of running a 
candidate using the company’s proxy statement would be greater than running a candidate in the 
traditional manner. 
While we agree with Kahan and Rock that the number of actual candidates under a 
shareholder access regime may very well be small, we believe that Kahan and Rock give too 13 
 
little weight to the potential for more meaningful “constructive engagement” between large 
shareholders and the company under a proxy access regime, when the “stick” of a proxy access 
candidate is lurking in the background.  Moreover, Kahan and Rock’s predictions about 
shareholders’ willingness to use proxy access are based on past behavior, and do not account for 
the possibility that shareholder behavior would change in response to a new regime.
20  Leaving 
aside the hypothetical future role of proxy access, our study focuses on a set of investors with a 
track record of activism (i.e., we study the value changes for firms held by such investors). In 
any event, we agree with Kahan and Rock that proxy access would have both costs and benefits; 
the question then becomes how best to predict whether the benefits outweigh the costs, and the 
magnitude of the net benefits if any. 
The idea of empirically evaluating regulatory changes with stock market data was 
introduced by Schwert (1981).
21 Two prior studies and one contemporaneous study use this 
methodology to examine the wealth effects of shareholder proxy access.  Akyol, Lim and 
Verwijmeren (2010) examines 14 events between September 2006 and December 2009 that, in 
their interpretation, increased
22 or decreased
23 the likelihood of shareholder proxy access.  For 
                                                 
20 In a recent presentation of this paper at NYU alongside Kahan and Rock, one of us observed that Kahan & Rock’s 
approach to proxy access could similarly be used to predict that texting is unlikely to be a significant mode of 
communication: texting is just slightly less costly than e-mail (e.g., no need for a header, as is the convention with e-
mail), and in some ways texting is more costly than e-mail (e.g., you need to know the phone number rather than just 
the e-mail address).   Of course, this prediction would be highly inaccurate because behavior has in fact changed in 
response to the new technology, at least in part because text messages go to a space (the phone number) that is far 
more sacrosanct than the e-mail in box.  The analogy to proxy access should be apparent: a simple cost/benefit 
analysis ignores the possibility for behavior change due to the fact that a proxy access candidate goes to a “sacred 
space,” namely, the company’s own proxy statement.   
21 See Hochberg, Sapienza and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009) for a recent example.   
22 The nine events that, according to the authors, increased the likelihood of shareholder proxy access were: the 
Second Circuit’s holding in AFSCME v. CA (Sept. 5, 2006), the SEC announcement of a roundtable discussion on 
proxy access (April 24, 2007), the SEC’s disclosure of a proposed rule on proxy access (July 27, 2007), a speech by 
SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter on proxy access (Feb. 18, 2009), a speech by SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro on 
proxy access (April 6, 2009), the SEC’s announcement that it would vote on a proposed rule (May 12, 2009), the 
SEC’s announcement of the content of the proposed rule (May 14, 2009), the introduction of the Schumer Bill in the 
U.S. Senate (May 19, 2009), and the SEC’s vote in favor of the proposed rule on proxy access (May 20, 2009). 
23 The five events that, according to the authors, decreased the likelihood of shareholder proxy access were: the 
SEC’s publication of a final Rule 14a-8 with no substantial changes (Nov. 28, 2007), the SEC’s publication of a 14 
 
each event date, they compare the return of a portfolio of U.S. firms to the return of a global 
market portfolio (excluding U.S. firms) and to a Canadian market portfolio.  They also isolate 
U.S. financial firms from other U.S. firms, on the theory that financial firms might be more 
likely to be targeted by shareholders for proxy access.  Six of the events taken individually 
produce statistically significant abnormal returns around the event dates (at 95% confidence), 
and when the events are aggregated the returns are highly significant and inversely correlated 
with shareholder proxy access.  Specifically, the authors find that an increased likelihood of 
shareholder access reduced returns to the U.S. portfolio relative to the non-U.S. portfolios, and 
for U.S. financial firms relative to non-financial U.S. firms.  The authors conclude that 
“increasing shareholder rights . . . may actually be detrimental to shareholder wealth,” and that 
the results “highlight the need for the SEC to further deliberate on the proposed rule, and to 
consider not implementing the proposed changes.”  
Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2010) similarly use an event study approach to examine 
thirteen events between March 2007 and June 2009 that arguably increased
24 or decreased
25 the 
likelihood of shareholder proxy access.  The authors use the number of institutions with 1% or 
more ownership (NLargeBlock) and the number of possible coalitions that would control 1% or 
                                                                                                                                                             
final Rule 14a-8(i)(8) with no substantial changes (Dec. 12, 2007), the introduction of an opt-in shareholder proxy 
access bill in the Delaware House of Representatives (Mar. 10, 2009), the passage of this bill in the Delaware House 
(March 18, 2009), the passage of the bill in the Delaware Senate (April 8, 2009), and the reopening of the comment 
period on the SEC proposed Rule on shareholder access (Dec. 14, 2009). 
24 The eight events that, according to the authors, increased the likelihood of shareholder proxy access are: first 
mention of the Schumer Bill in the press (April 25, 2009), introduction of the Schumer Bill in the U.S. Senate (May 
19, 2009), first mention of the Shareholder Empowerment Act in the press (June 12, 2009),  the SEC announcement 
of a roundtable discussion on proxy access (April 24, 2007), the SEC announcement of amendments to Rule 14a-8 
14a-8(i)(8) (July 27, 2007), first mention of potential amendments to Rule 14a-11 (April 6, 2009),  the SEC’s vote in 
favor of the proposed rule on proxy access (May 20, 2009), and the publication of the SEC’s draft proposal for Rule 
14a-11 (June 10, 2009). 
25 The five events that, according to the authors, decreased the likelihood of shareholder proxy access are: the SEC’s 
publication of a final Rule 14a-8 with no substantial changes (Nov. 28, 2007), the SEC’s publication of a final Rule 
14a-8(i)(8) with no substantial changes (Dec. 6, 2007), the introduction of an opt-in shareholder proxy access bill in 
the Delaware House of Representatives (Mar. 10, 2009), the passage of this bill in the Delaware House (Mar. 18, 
2009), the passage of the bill in the Delaware Senate (April 8, 2009), and the reopening of the comment period on 
the SEC proposed Rule on shareholder access (Dec. 14, 2009). 15 
 
more of the shares outstanding (NSmallCoalitions) as proxies for a company’s exposure to a 
shareholder access rule.  For five out of the thirteen events, the authors find a statistically 
significant (at 95% confidence) negative correlation between NLargeBlock and events that 
increased the likelihood of shareholder proxy access.  For a (somewhat different) five out of 
thirteen events, the authors find a statistically significant negative correlation between 
NSmallCoalitions and events that increased the likelihood of proxy access.  As with the Akyol 
study, the coefficients for both NLargeBlock and NSmallCoalitions become highly significant 
and inversely correlated with increased likelihood of shareholder access when all thirteen events 
are pooled.  The authors conclude that their findings are consistent with the view that >1% 
shareholders “will use the privileges afforded to them by proxy access regulation to manipulate 
the governance process to make themselves better off at the expense of other shareholders.”  
Larcker and Tayan (2010) summarize this literature as suggesting that “regulation of corporate 
governance is viewed negatively by shareholders.”  
One problem inherent in these prior event studies is that at least some of the events being 
studied are of questionable importance.  For example, both the Akyol study and the Larcker 
study identify the announcement of a SEC roundtable discussion series on April 24, 2007 as an 
event that increased the likelihood of proxy access.  With the SEC having considered proxy 
access off-and-on for most of the prior decade (and having already promised to take up proxy 
access after the AFSCME decision the prior year), it is not clear why the announcement of a 
roundtable discussion – with, of course, no prediction on what conclusions the discussants would 
reach – should convey meaningful information to the marketplace, much less increase the 
likelihood of proxy access.  16 
 
In fact, the impact of the April 24 announcement on the likelihood of proxy access is not 
even directionally clear.  At the time of the announcement, the AFSCME decision permitted 
proxy access on a company-by-company basis.  In the press release announcing the Roundtable 
series, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox noted generally: “This roundtable will explore the 
relationship between the federal proxy rules and state corporation law, and pose questions to the 
participants about whether this relationship can be improved.”
26  After the Roundtable, the first 
move from the SEC, proposed in October 2007 and finalized in December 2007, was 
amendments to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) that overruled the AFSCME decision and eliminated proxy 
access.  To the extent that investors interpreted Cox’s general statement to mean that the 
AFSCME decision was vulnerable (which, in retrospect, would have been an accurate 
interpretation) the April 24 announcement should have decreased the likelihood of shareholder 
access, rather than increased it as the Akyrol and Larcker studies predict. 
A second potential problem with the Akyrol and Larcker studies is that many of the 
events were predicted in advance, at least in part, by the marketplace.  For example, it is well-
known that the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association, not the Delaware 
legislature, creates Delaware corporate law.  Once the Corporate Law Section voted in favor of a 
shareholder access amendment on February 26, 2009, its implementation in Delaware became 
virtually a foregone conclusion.  Both the Akyol study and the Larcker study examine the 
introduction of the shareholder access bill in the Delaware House of Representatives (March 10, 
2009), the passage of the bill in the House (March 18), and the passage of the bill in the 
Delaware Senate (April 8), but fail to examine the recommendation from the Corporate Law 
Council that occurred on February 26.  Similarly, the promulgation of the final Rule on August 
25, 2010 was very accurately predicted in press reports ahead of its actual announcement.  If the 
                                                 
26 SEC Announces Roundtable Discussions Regarding Proxy Access, Press Release (April 24, 2007). 17 
 
marketplace fully anticipates an event, then wealth effects around the event date can be 
meaningless. 
Despite these deficiencies, the Akyol and Larcker studies have led some commentators to 
conclude that shareholder proxy access reduces shareholder wealth.  For example, Grundfest 
(2010) summarizes the “consistent conclusion” from the two studies as follows: 
 [P]roxy access, as currently proposed by the Commission, reduces shareholder 
wealth, and, even if preferred by vocal institutional investors, is inimical to the 
best interests of the shareholder community as a whole. . . . The best currently 
available empirical data indicate that, given a choice between the current regime 
and the Commission’s proxy access rules, shareholders seeking to maximize 
returns would prefer the status quo because the proposed rules appear to destroy 
shareholder wealth. 
 
 
It should also be noted that both the Akyol and Larcker studies were submitted to the 
SEC as comment letters during the rulemaking process, and were referenced by the SEC in the 
final Rule.  We find the reliance on these prior event studies to be troubling because many of the 
events were widely-anticipated, confounded, directionally unclear, and/or not meaningful, for 
reasons described above.
 27  In contrast, we study a main event that in our view was 
unanticipated, unconfounded, directionally clear, and highly meaningful with respect to proxy 
access. Our second event, the Supreme Court ruling in 2011, was predictable but of unknown 
direction and also directionally clear. 
Cohn, Gillan, and Hartzell (2010) also study proxy access using an event study 
methodology, focusing on firms with activist investors (but using a classification scheme for 
investors that differs from ours). They use three event dates, all more recent than the Larcker and 
                                                 
27 See also Steven Davidoff, The Heated Debate Over Shareholder Access, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010) 
(“What is remarkable about these arguments is the lack of empirical evidence about the actual effect that proxy 
access would have on the value of public corporations. That is, there is no scientific evidence either way on the 
impact that shareholder proxy access will have on the stock prices of public corporations. Will it make these 
companies more or less valuable? Behind this question is whether proxy access has positive or negative worth. 
Until this month, there have only been two empirical studies even purporting to look at these issues.”). 18 
 
Akyol studies: a refinement of the proxy access rule that clarified the position size requirements 
for proxy access (June 16-17, 2010); an additional refinement that led to the dropping of the five 
percent threshold from the Dodd-Frank bill (June 24-25, 2010); and the ultimate passage of the 
proxy access rule (August 25, 2010).  Cohn et al. argue that the 5% size requirement introduced 
on June 16/17 was a higher threshold than expected in the marketplace, and therefore should be 
interpreted as a negative event for proxy access.  When this 5% requirement was dropped on 
June 24/25 this was, in turn, a positive event for proxy access.  On August 25, when the final 
Rule was announced, Cohn et al. argue that the surprise event was the three-year holding period 
rather than two years expected by the marketplace; therefore this was a negative event for proxy 
access.   The authors find a positive correlation between proxy access and shareholder wealth, 
i.e., the two negative events reduced value for companies most vulnerable to proxy access, and 
the one positive event increased value for companies most vulnerable to proxy access.  These 
findings stand in contrast to the findings from the Akyol and Larcker studies.The Cohn et al 
paper is similar to this study in that it examines the differential return between firms with and 
without activist owners. We use different event dates, and sources of the set of activists. Like us, 
Cohn et al conclude that proxy access appears to have been ascribed positive value by the stock 
market. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
The unexpected delay that occurred on October 4, 2010 provides the basis for an 
empirical test of the wealth effects of shareholder access. We apply the idea of Schwert (1981) 
that stock price changes following the announcement can be informative about the market’s 19 
 
evaluation of the impact of regulation on value.   While our focus is on October 4, 2010, we also 
examine July 22, 2011, when the D.C. Circuit invalidated proxy access. 
For an event to be useful as a natural experiment, there are several requirements.  First, it 
has to be unexpected. By all accounts, the SEC’s delay was unexpected, and therefore not 
predicted in advance by the marketplace. Second, the value impact has to affect stock prices – 
that is, it must be a relatively significant event.  The degree of debate and press coverage around 
shareholder proxy access suggests that implementation of the Rule was a significant event, and, 
by extension, the delay of the rule was also significant.  The fact that the SEC had already 
implemented shareholder access means that a specific Rule was on the table, and all companies 
reacted to the same Rule.  Finally, evading the proposed regulatory reform must be difficult or 
impossible.  Rule 14a-11 is a mandatory rule, with no prospect for opt-out.  For this reason, 
market prices before October 4 likely did not reflect any possibility that companies might evade 
the Rule. 
If the marketplace perceived that shareholder access would increase shareholder value, 
then companies that would have been most exposed to the new Rule should decline in value, 
relative to companies that would have been more insulated from the Rule.  If the marketplace 
perceived that shareholder access would decrease shareholder value, then companies that would 
have been most exposed to the Rule should increase in value, relative to those that would have 
been more insulated.  Furthermore, we can use the event to test if the perceived value effect of 
shareholder access depends on the features of a firm or its shareholders.  For example, the 
possibility of board representation may be more valuable when shareholders are sophisticated, or 
if they are more willing to get involved with the governance of a firm.  Board representation may 
be less valuable if the board already represents the views of outside investors well. 20 
 
We use several proxies for determining which companies were more and less likely to be 
affected by the SEC’s proxy access Rule.  First, and most importantly, we examine the 
institutional ownership of the companies in our sample, on the assumption that institutions, 
particularly institutions that held 3% or more of the company’s stock, would be most likely to 
make use of proxy access.  We also distinguish between activist institutions such as hedge funds, 
and traditionally passive institutions such as index funds, on the view that activist institutions 
would be more likely to make use of proxy access. Many institutions are reluctant to exercise 
control rights and participate in activism (Pozen 2003, Kahan and Rock 2011).  Examples 
include index funds and some pension funds (see e.g. Del Guercio and Hawkins 1999).  Other 
institutions are much more prone to activism and direct influence on corporate governance. For 
example, Kahan and Rock (2006) argue that hedge funds have stronger financial incentives and 
fewer regulatory constraints than mutual funds, and may therefore be better able to monitor firms 
in their portfolios. Greenwood and Schor (2009) also suggest that hedge funds may be better able 
to identify underperforming companies.    
 Finally, because the SEC’s Rule would have given proxy access to investors who had 
held their positions for at least 3 years, we explore empirical specifications that capture the 
length of time that the firms’ existing investors, activist or otherwise, have held their stakes.   
We also use three other governance-related measures for determining which companies 
were more impacted by the SEC’s proxy access rule.  First, we distinguish between companies 
incorporated in Delaware and those that are not.  At least since May 2009 and likely before, 
shareholders in Delaware companies have had the ability to opt-in to shareholder access, while 
shareholders of companies incorporated in other states do not clearly have this right.  It seems 21 
 
possible, therefore, that Delaware companies would have benefitted less from SEC-mandated 
shareholder access than companies incorporated in other states.    
Finally, we differentiate companies according to whether they have a staggered board, 
perhaps the most important antitakeover defense (Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian 2002), and 
according to their Governance Index (Gompers, Ishii and  Metrick 2003).  Both of these 
measures test the theory that companies with greater entrenchment might be more vulnerable to 
the SEC’s Rule. 
The impact of shareholder proxy access may also depend on the scope for improvement 
in firm performance.  A firm with strong current performance and a high stock price may offer 
fewer opportunities for intervention.  We therefore sort firms based on lagged stock returns and 
valuation ratios, to test whether the impact of institutional and activist institutional ownership is 
strongest among the firms with the worst recent performance.  
Because our empirical results are based on a single event and stock returns have patterns 
of cross-sectional correlation, our approach and our measures of statistical significance must be 
adjusted accordingly.  Our baseline regressions use risk-adjusted returns, which control for 
market performance and the two additional risk factors identified in Fama and French (1993) 
(see the data section for details).  Using risk-adjusted returns means that we control for the 
overall pattern of market movements on October 4.  We also report results from using raw 
returns as the dependent variable for the sake of completeness. 
We also need to address cross-sectional correlation among stock returns. Incorrectly 
assuming independence in stock movements can yield standard error estimates that are biased 
downward (Fama and French 2000). Therefore, we do not rely on standard regression standard 
error estimates to assess the significance of our coefficient estimates. Instead, we assess the 22 
 
significance of our results in two ways: GLS standard errors and non-parametric assessment 
using the empirical distribution of coefficient estimates. To calculate GLS standard errors, we 
follow Greenwood (2005) and use pre-event return data for our sample stocks to estimate the 
covariance matrix for individual stock returns. We then use the estimated covariance matrix to 
calculate standard error estimates that adjust for the observed correlations between different 
stocks.
28  Applied to this setting, we find GLS standard error estimates are approximately twice 
as large as OLS standard errors.  In all tables reporting regressions, we report the GLS standard 
errors as well as p-values from the empirical distribution of coefficient estimates.  
As a less parametric approach to assessing significance, we re-estimate each regression in 
the 67 trading days after June 30, 2010.  We do not use earlier dates because our key variables of 
interest are based on institutional holdings as of June 30.  We then use the empirical distribution 
of coefficient estimates to test the significance of each of our regression coefficients.  In other 
words, we empirically estimate how many days other than the event day would have delivered 
estimated coefficients equal in magnitude to the coefficient we estimate for October 4.  Because 
our significance estimates using this empirical approach are very similar to the GLS-based 
estimates, our tables report only the GLS standard errors.   
 
4. Data 
We collect stock price data from Datastream, and define each stock’s return as the log of 
the closing stock price on Monday, October 4, minus the log of the closing stock price on Friday, 
October 1.  We use a one-day event window because the SEC’s announcement on delaying 
                                                 
28 In matrix notation, we use             Ω          to estimate standard errors, where X is a vector of return 
data, and  is the pre-event covariance matrix of returns. This differs from basic OLS standard errors which use the 
identity matrix in place of .  An underlying assumption in this approach is that the pre-event covariance matrix is 
an appropriate estimate for the true underlying covariance matrix on October 4.   23 
 
shareholder access came out during the trading day on October 4.
29  We estimate factor-adjusted 
returns based on the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, which controls for firms’ exposure 
to overall stock market movements as well as a value/growth effect and a small firm effect.  We 
estimate firm betas on the Fama-French factors using daily stock returns for the period between 
January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009.  We use the daily factor returns from Ken French’s data 
library.
30  We winsorize all three beta estimates at the 5
th and 95
th percentiles.   
We take the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) governance measure for each S&P1500 
firm in 2006, the last year for which the index has been calculated.  From RiskMetrics, we 
identify firms with staggered board provisions and collect data on the number of board members.  
We collect data on each firm’s equity value from CRSP; this allows us to run both value-
weighted and equal-weighted empirical tests.  
Institutional ownership data come from ThomsonReuters, which summarizes data from 
13F filings by institutional investors.  We use data from the second quarter of 2010, because later 
data are incomplete.
31  We look exclusively at shares held by U.S. institutions.  For each 
investment manager, we calculate total holdings, as both dollars and number of stocks.  For each 
firm in the sample we construct the following measures of institutional ownership: the number of 
institutional owners; the number of institutional owners above the 3% ownership threshold (the 
requirement for proxy access under the Rule); a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has at least 
one institutional owner with a 3% stake; and the total ownership by institutions.  
Activist institutional investors are more willing to intervene in corporate governance than 
institutions overall.  Because these investors are particularly aggressive about influencing firm 
                                                 
29 The SEC announcement was time-stamped at 12:21 pm on October 4.  The announcement hit Bloomberg at 3:20 
pm that day. 
30 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. Accessed October 12, 2010. 
31 An earlier draft of the paper used holdings data from the first quarter of 2010.   24 
 
management and board composition, they are more likely to have made use of proxy access (see 
e.g. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 2008).  We use the classification of activist investors 
identified by Greenwood and Schor (2009).  They construct a sample of activists based on 13D 
filings and DFAN filings with the SEC.  Investment managers and other investors must file a 
13D filling with the SEC within 10 days of acquiring 5% or more of any class of a company's 
securities.  13D filings also include a “Purpose of Transaction” section which allows Greenwood 
and Schor to identify activist purposes and exclude investors whose 13D filings reflect passive 
strategies.  DFAN filings are filed with the SEC by investors intending to engage in a proxy fight 
with firm management.  These filings allow Greenwood and Schor to construct a list of activist 
investors, which they identify as investors whose 13D or DFAN filings indicate activist intent. 
They identify 177 investment managers as activists, of which 139 are hedge funds and 38 are 
non-hedge funds. Many of the activist investors in the Greenwood and Schor sample are serial 
activists.  In particular, eleven hedge funds account for more than two-thirds of the activist 
activity in the Greenwood and Schor sample.
32 The Greenwood and Schor classification is 
narrow in the sense that some activist investors will not appear because they (a) held stakes that 
were too small to trigger the 13D filing requirement; or (b) the purpose statements may not be 
accurate, or may become less accurate over time for a given holding (since the filing is done at 
initial acquisition).  
 We collect firm data from the CRSP-Compustat merged database. For each firm, we 
calculate its 2009 end of year book-to-market ratio (book value of common equity divided by the 
stock price times number of shares outstanding), minus the mean of its Fama-French (48) 
                                                 
32 They are: Farallon Capital, Steel Partners, VA Partners, Wynnefield, Blum Capital, Carl Icahn, Chapman Capital, 
Newcastle Partners, JANA, Third Point, and Pirate Capital. 25 
 
industry. Similarly, we calculate the industry-adjusted calendar year 2009 stock return using the 
Fama-French 48-sector industry classification.
33   
 
5. Results 
Our main sample is the S&P 1500 because these firms are large, liquid, and heavily 
traded, but our results also hold for the larger universe of all publicly-traded companies.  In the 
S&P 1500, we have ownership data for 1,388 firms.  Panel A of Table 1 shows the mean 
institutional ownership as well as activist institutional ownership, both by decile. There is 
substantial variation in each of these measures.  Institutional ownership overall amounts to about 
half of the typical company’s shares, but in the bottom decile, institutional ownership averages 
about 25.3 percent.  In the top decile it averages almost 70 percent.  Activist institutional 
ownership averages 0.05% of the shares in the bottom decile, but over 13% of shares in the top 
decile.  
a. Institutional ownership 
Panel B of Table 1 presents summary statistics for four measures of institutional 
ownership: the raw total institutional ownership; the number of owners with at least 3% of the 
capital; the highest single activist institutional ownership stake; and the number of activist 
institutional owners. 
Table 2 sorts firms by institutional ownership, and examine returns on October 4 across 
the different levels of institutional ownership.  Figure 1 presents the same information in graphic 
form.  The first column shows that the average equal-weighted return was -124 basis points, but 
firms in the highest ownership decile dropped 44 basis points more than firms in the lowest 
ownership decile.  The difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level.  
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The next column reports excess returns, which control for firms’ exposure to the market, 
size, and value factors.  Using this return measure, the difference between the returns of high and 
low institutional ownership stocks is 37 basis points.  Sorting on activist owners produces a 
differential of 43 basis points.  Both of these differences are statistically significant.   
Table 3 presents the baseline regression results.  In column (1), we regress the excess 
returns for the day of each stock in the S&P 1500 index on institutional ownership. The 
coefficient estimate in this specification is -137 basis points, significantly different from zero at 
the 10 percent confidence level. Here and throughout the paper, our reported standard errors 
account for the observed correlation of individual stock returns, as discussed in Section 3.  The 
R-squared in this regression is low, reflecting the noisy nature of stock returns and the many 
factors that will affect individual securities. Although our event clearly affected a subset of firms 
(i.e. the t-stat is significant), it was not the major mover of stock prices that day (this also applies 
to the specifications we report below). The coefficient estimate implies that a 10 percentage 
point increase in institutional ownership was associated with an additional 14 basis point loss of 
value on October 4.  Column (2) of Table 3 presents a similar regression for activist institutions. 
The estimated coefficients are larger in magnitude and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
confidence level.  The coefficient estimate implies that a ten percentage point increase in activist 
ownership is associated with a 55 basis point drop in value on October 4.
34  
In columns (3) and (4), we repeat these tests using excess returns.  Our excess return 
measures  adjust returns based on the Fama-French three-factor model.  Betas for the three-factor 
model are estimated using daily data from 2009.  The coefficient estimate using the 
comprehensive institutional ownership measure is -113 basis points, again significant at the ten 
                                                 
34 Results using the time window [0,2] or [-1,2], i.e. returns of October 2 and October 5, are similar to baseline 
results in magnitude and statistical significance. Results with the [0,3] time window which incorporates returns on 
October 5 and October, 6, are similar in magnitudes but insignificant. 27 
 
percent level.  The coefficient estimate for the activist institutional ownership measure is -527 
basis points, significant at the 1 percent confidence level. From this point on, we only report 
regressions with excess returns.  This approach is more conservative, and controls for any 
differences in factor exposures across stocks.  Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 examine value-
weighted excess returns. Coefficient estimates are slightly larger, but the estimated statistical 
significance falls.
35   
  These results are consistent with a loss in value for those firms expected to benefit from 
proxy access in the future. Are they also consistent with a general loss of faith in SEC 
enforcement? We believe that they are. However, this does not appear to explain the lower 
returns for firms that were more likely proxy access targets, since there is no reason that SEC 
enforcement generally should affect exactly those firms that had high activist ownership. Put 
differently, we cannot evaluate the extent that the case was perceived as bad news for the SEC’s 
ability to enforce more generally, as long as that effect was market-wide (or affected a different 
set of firms from those we identified using activist ownership). We cannot extract the market’s 
view of the SEC’s general ability to enforce rules. 
b. Intra-day returns 
We now turn to intra-day returns to assess the extent to which our 1-day results can be 
attributed to the SEC’s announcement on proxy access.  We start with within-day trading data 
from Bloomberg for all available firms from the S&P 1500 for October 4, 2010.  We divide the 
trading day into 5-minute windows and calculate for each stock the average trading price during 
the 5-minute window.  We then calculate a cumulative return measure for each 5-minute window 
                                                 
35 If the observed price drop for firms with high activist ownership reflected temporary price pressure as activists 
dumped their positions, we might expect smaller responses for large institutions since these have deeper and more 
liquid trading, and can be expected to have smaller price responses to idiosyncratic trading. The fact that the point 
estimates in the value weighted regress are larger, suggests that we are not necessarily measuring a temporary price 
movement. We discuss this issue, and try longer time windows to address this concnern, below. 28 
 
using the change in price from the previous day’s close to price observed within that window.  
We then estimate 79 different regressions of cumulative returns on our activism measure: one for 
each of the 78 within-day windows and one for the return based on market closing price.   
Figure 2 shows the results of our analysis.  The aggregate market movement that we 
document in Table 2 occurs mostly during the morning hours, while the divergence between the 
activist-owned firms and other firms appears to have come mostly in the afternoon, after the 
SEC’s announcement.  The effect appears to have accelerated at the end of the day, after the 
Bloomberg coverage of the SEC’s announcement.  This intra-day analysis suggests that our 
observed activism effect is not a spurious result arising from insufficient control for the overall 
market movement; in addition, the timing also appears consistent with the hypothesis that the 
SEC’s announcement caused the underperformance of activist-held firms on October 4, 2010. 
c. Alternative specifications 
Table 4 examines alternative measures of institutional ownership. In column (1), we 
measure the largest institutional stake (as a share of firm equity value), including both activist 
and non-activist institutions.  The estimated coefficient is negative and not statistically 
significant.  Column (2) regresses the October 4 excess return on the largest single activist stake, 
and our estimated coefficient of -642 basis points is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
confidence level.  The fact that this coefficient is larger than the coefficient for total activist 
ownership highlights the role of large single activist investors.  This is consistent with an 
important role for concentrated institutional ownership, and may reflect coordination costs or 
free-riding (see e.g., Grossman and Hart 1980, Shleifer and Vishny 1986). 
The third alternative measure is motivated by the details of the SEC’s Rule, which would 
have required an owner to have a 3 percent stake to qualify for proxy access. Although the Rule 29 
 
would have allowed investors to combine for the purpose of proxy access, having an individual 
owner above the 3 percent threshold means that proxy access was feasible without coordination.  
Having more such owners might increase the likelihood further (this number ranges from zero to 
four).  In column (3), the coefficient on the number of institutional owners with stakes above 3 
percent is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient estimate implies that 
each additional large, institutional owner in a firm is associated with a reduction of equity value 
by 33 basis points on October 4. 
d. Firm heterogeneity 
Having established that activist ownership is associated with negative returns on October 
4, we now test hypotheses about the relationship between firm characteristics and the value of 
proxy access.  Table 5 presents the results of this analysis.  All of these results use excess return 
measures, use the S&P 1500 sample, and control for activist institutional ownership. In general, 
the evidence of any role for governance metrics is weak. 
Our first test looks at the impact of staggered boards, as a proxy for corporate governance 
at each firm.   The regression results in column (1) of Table 5 suggest that having a staggered is 
not predictive of stock return on the event day.  In column (2), we use the Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) governance index (“G”).  The hypothesis is that firms with poor governance 
measures (high G values) may see larger potential benefits from shareholder proxy access.  
Again, the results are close to zero, and we cannot reject a zero effect at standard confidence 
levels.
36   
We next turn to Delaware incorporation. Because Delaware corporate law already 
facilitates opt-in proxy access, the SEC rule might have had a smaller effect for Delaware 
                                                 
36 We have also included the interaction of the GIM index with activist ownership. This interaction is not related to 
returns, suggesting that the value of the governance index does not mediate the important of proxy access.  30 
 
companies.
37  Alternatively, if investors perceived that a proxy access proposal would not be 
prohibited in other states, notwithstanding their lack of explicit recognition of the possibility of 
opting in, then Delaware firms should react no differently than firms in other states.  We test 
these competing hypotheses by including the interaction of a dummy for Delaware incorporation 
and institutional ownership, as well as a dummy variable for Delaware incorporation.  The 
coefficient estimate on the Delaware dummy itself is negative and significant.  The interaction of 
the Delaware dummy with institutional ownership is positive and significant at the 10 percent 
confidence level. The different coefficients imply that non-Delaware firms saw value drop by 81 
basis points for every 10 percentage points of activist ownership, while  Delaware-incorporated 
firms dropped by only 31 basis points per 10 percentage points of activist ownership (=0.1*(-
810+497) basis points). Thus, the estimated effect of institutional ownership is much smaller for 
Delaware firms, consistent with our prediction that the marketplaces considers explicit 
recognition of opt-in proxy access at Delaware firms to be meaningful.  
We also examine board structure, specifically, board size.  Yermack (1996) argues that 
smaller boards are more effective than large boards. If this is true, there may be less scope for 
improvement for firms with small boards, and so the proxy rule announcement return might be 
larger (i.e., smaller losses for firms that were already well managed). On the other hand, 
shareholder nominees might have more influence on a smaller board than on a larger board (even 
though the fraction of directors remains the same, at one-quarter), and so the withdrawn rule 
might have had more impact on firms with small boards.  We test these competing hypotheses 
for board size in column (4) of Table 5.  The coefficient on the board size variable is positive and 
                                                 
37 The same argument would also hold for North Dakota companies, where the corporate law since 2007 has 
provided mandatory proxy access for any 5% shareholder that has held their shares for at least two years.  See 
Publicly Traded Corporations Act ch. 102, 2007 N.D. Laws 497, codified at North Dakota Cent. Code § 10-35-08.  
However, there are no North Dakota firms in the S&P 1500. 31 
 
statistically insignificant, indicating that the value loss on October 4 did not depend on board 
size.
38 
e. Investor heterogeneity: holding periods 
We next examine the effect of institutional holding periods.  The proposed SEC Rule 
would have given proxy access to investors whose stakes had been held for 3 years or more.  We 
thus construct two additional measures of institutional ownership: the first measure (used in 
columns (2) and (5) of Table 6) is a measure of institutional ownership that includes only the 
institutional stakes that have been held for more than 3 years.  The second measure is based on a 
weighting scheme, applying a (1/12) weight for holdings held for only 3 months, up through a 
(12/12) weight to holdings held for 12 quarters. Therefore, the variable puts progressively more 
weight on holdings that are closer to qualifying under the Rule. Columns (1)-(3) use the baseline 
measure of institutional ownership, the measure of three year old stakes, and the weighted 
measure. Columns (4)-(6) we use only activist investors, and apply the same three methods.  
Coefficient estimates are higher when we use the measures of ownership that control for holding 
duration, and as before borderline significant for overall institutions, and highly significant for 
activists.  This finding is consistent with the marker reaction on October 4 reflecting holding 
periods as well as the amount of institutional ownership. 
f. Lagged firm performance 
Our final analysis examines the relationship between lagged firm performance and the 
results we have described above.  The scope for improvement by activist investors should vary 
across firms, and be related to firms’ previous performance.  We test this hypothesis by sorting 
firms based on variables related to recent performance: the end of 2009 book-to-market ratio (the 
                                                 
38 We have replicated this finding with alternative measures of board size, such as the number of directors per 
million dollars of equity market value (unreported). 32 
 
ratio of equity book value to market value) and the stock return over 2007-2009. For each of 
these variables, we demean by Fama-French industry using all firms in the same 48-industry 
classification.   Our assumption is that poor performance relative to a firm’s industry is a good 
proxy for the available scope of potential improvements.  Table 7 presents the results of this 
analysis.  Columns (1) and (2) are split by 2007-2009 stock return; columns (3) and (4) are split 
by market-to-book ratios.
39 The impact of activist institutional ownership is larger in firms with 
poor recent performance.  The difference between the coefficient estimates in the subsamples is 
large but insignificant for both splits.  
g. The D.C. Circuit decision event date (July 22, 2011) 
We repeat our event study methodology on July 22, 2011, when the D.C. Circuit 
invalidated the proxy access Rule.  Results are reported in Table 8, using 2010Q2 measures of 
activist holdings, for equal-weighted raw returns, equal-weighted excess returns and value-
weighted excess returns for the one day event window of the day of the ruling. The estimate for 
equal-weighted excess return (the smallest estimate of the three) is -463 basis points, implying 
that a 10% difference in activist holdings corresponds to a 4.6% loss in value on the July 22. The 
loss in value for firms with activist owners is therefore slightly smaller on July 22 than on 
October 4 of the previous year, but directionally similar. To the extent that the court’s ruling was 
a further negative surprise regarding the availability of proxy access going forward, these results 
are consistent with the results reported with respect to the October 4 event date (that is, 
companies that were more vulnerable to shareholder proxy access suffered an abnormal decline 
on that day)The smaller estimated effect might be due to the fact that the July 22 event changed 
                                                 
39 Because we split by whether a firm is above or below average, not median, industry performance, and because we 
define averages for all Compustat firms, not just the S&P1500 group, the subsamples are not exactly of equal size. 
The logic of the test seems to suggest that the best possible split into strong and weak performers is more important 
than getting equal size samples. Splitting so that samples are equal size provides qualitatively similar results. We 
have also performed splits into more groups (i.e., quartiles), with similar results. 33 
 
expectations on proxy access less than the October 4 event.  On October 4, the likelihood of 
proxy access went from virtually 100% to 0%, at least for 2011 and maybe for longer.  On July 
22, the likelihood of proxy access went from something substantially less than 100% to 0%, at 
least for 2012 and maybe for longer.  
40 
 
6. Discussion  
We find that the companies that would have been most vulnerable to the SEC’s 
shareholder proxy access rule experienced a statistically significant drop in value after the 
unexpected delay in the Rule on October 4, 2010.    The magnitude of the implied positive effect 
of proxy access that we find is economically significant.  We estimate that firms that would have 
been most affected by proxy access, as measured by overall institutional ownership, lost 12 basis 
points of value for each standard deviation of ownership.  For firms that had large ownership 
stakes held by historically activist institutions, the value loss was almost five times as large.  The 
results highlight the importance of the process for nominating and electing directors.  
This value loss is particularly striking because the October 4 event only created some 
probability (less than 1) of losing shareholder proxy access.  We find a directionally similar, 
though not statistically significant, drop in shareholder value on July 22, 2011, when the D.C. 
Circuit invalidated the SEC’s proxy access rule.  To the extent that the market did not anticipate 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision, our October 4 results only measure the value loss from delaying 
shareholder proxy access by one year.  That is, the value of shareholder proxy access is likely to 
be larger than what is captured in our event study. 
                                                 
40 By way of comparison, Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2011) found a positive and significant stock market reaction 
when the Delaware Chancery Court (in effect) unexpectedly weakened staggered boards, and then a negative and 
statistically significant stock market reaction when the Delaware Supreme Court unexpectedly reversed the 
Chancery Court decision.  The two events in the Bebchuk et al. study operated in opposite directions. 34 
 
Our findings are consistent with Cohn et al. (2011), which uses three event dates from 
2010 (though not October 4).  They find that the events that they argue increased the likelihood 
or impact of shareholder proxy access increased firm equity value, and events that decreased the 
likelihood or impact of shareholder access decreased firm equity value. 
Our findings are inconsistent with Larcker et al. (2010) and Akyol et al. (2010).  These 
prior papers found that events that (arguably) increased the likelihood of shareholder proxy 
access reduced firm value, and vice versa.  The difference between our findings and these prior 
papers might be explained by time differences.  For example, in 2006-09, the market might have 
had a negative view of shareholder proxy access, but this view might have changed by 2010.  
Alternatively, or in addition, in 2006-09, the market did not have clarity on what the final Rule 
would look like, but by October 2010 the market reacted to a well-defined Rule.   
Another possibility that would explain the different findings between our paper and the 
prior related work might be the different methodologies used, or the nature of the events 
themselves.  For reasons explained in Sections 2-3, we believe that the October 4 event provides 
the cleanest test on the value of shareholder proxy access because the October 4 event.  In our 
view, the October 4 event, unlike all prior events, was material, directionally clear, and also not 
expected by the marketplace. 
In order to examine the influence of methodological differences, we examined some of 
the dates proposed in other papers using our methodology: i.e. regressing three-factor excess 
returns on our measure of activist holdings. In our sample of large firms (S&P1500), coefficient 
estimates (the return difference for a one hundred percentage point change in institutional 
ownership) for June 16-17, 2010; June 24-25, 2010 and August 25, 2010 were 156, 17, and 279 35 
 
basis points, respectively.
41
 The t-statistics for these coefficients, using the Greenwood (2005) 
GLS standard errors, are -0.78, 0.11 and 1.77, respectively. In other words, by our methodology, 
these dates do not deliver significant returns at the 95% statistical confidence level, a result that 
is consistent with our view (as discussed in Section 2) that these events were unlikely to have 
surprised the market. If instead of using the Greenwood (2005) GLS standard errors, we use 
standard error estimates that do not control for cross-stock correlations, our estimated t-stats 
become -1.37, 0.17, and 3.25, respectively. With these less precise standard errors, one out of 
three events appears to be statistically significant. When we use raw returns as the dependent 
variable (i.e. returns that are not adjusted for the impact of broad market movements, as captured 
by the 3-factor Fama French model), the coefficients and t-statistics (still unadjusted) are 57 
(t=6.47), 26 (t=2.48) and -837 (t=2.91). Using raw rather than factor-adjusted returns amounts to 
ignoring the factor and market exposures of activist-held firms, and is not, in our view, an 
appropriate econometric approach. These differences highlight the importance of addressing 
econometric concerns related to cross-correlation when dealing with individual stock returns. 
Regardless of the underlying explanations for the difference between our findings and the 
prior work, our paper, along with Cohn et al., challenges the conventional wisdom that the 
market believed that shareholder access reduced equity values.   The causal mechanism for this 
alternative view is straightforward: enhancing activist investors’ voice in corporate governance 
increases firm value.  This value effect was a consistent theme among proponents of the 
shareholder access Rule during the SEC’s comment period.   For example, Roy Katzovicz, 
general counsel for Bill Ackman’s Pershing Square Capital, noted in his comment letter: 
Engaged shareholders with meaningful stakes in the companies in which they 
invest have the potential to regulate corporate conduct through private and market 
behavior.  The existing tools of shareholder engagement, however, have not 
                                                 
41 These dates are included in Cohn et al (2011). 36 
 
proven to be sufficient or optimally suited for that task.  We believe that the 
SEC’s proposal to require public companies to include shareholder nominees in 
corporate proxy materials goes a long way toward better equipping shareholders 
to be more effective monitors of corporate behavior and, as a result, another force 
for good corporate governance.
42 
 
 
An alternative interpretation is that activist investors “dumped” shares on October 4.  As 
a starting point in assessing this claim, we find no evidence (in unreported analyses) of abnormal 
trading volumes on October 4, either overall or at companies that would have been particularly 
vulnerable to the Rule.  Indeed, it would be unusual for an activist investor to have held shares 
for three years in anticipation of proxy access, and then to have dumped shares within hours 
when there was a delay in gaining access to this right.  But even taking this theory at face value, 
it would be important to understand why activist investors dumped shares.  If they did so because 
their future voice had been unexpectedly reduced and therefore future cash flows were 
diminished, then this motivation would be consistent with the conclusion that shareholder access 
improves firm equity value.   If instead activists dumped shares because they would be delayed 
in their ability to extract private benefits at the expense of other shareholders and the company 
overall, then this motivation would be consistent with the conclusion that shareholder access 
reduces firm equity value.   As above, our analyses thus far cannot rule out this alternative 
explanation. 
 
7. Conclusion  
                                                 
42 http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009.shtml.  See also Comment Letter from Capital Research and 
Management (an activist fund with $775 billion in assets under management): “As long-term investors actively 
engaged in voting proxies in the interest of our funds’ shareholders, we support a process which allows for 
meaningful director elections, particularly in cases where corporate boards historically have been unresponsive to 
investor concerns.” 37 
 
This paper uses a relatively clean natural experiment to assess the shareholder wealth 
implications of shareholder proxy access.  Contrary to the prior event studies on proxy access, 
we find significant negative abnormal returns for companies that were most vulnerable to 
shareholder access on October 4, 2010, when the SEC unexpectedly delayed proxy access for 
U.S. public companies.  We find directionally similar, but slightly smaller, results on July 22, 
2011, when the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the Business Roundtable.  These findings are 
consistent with the view that financial markets placed a positive value on shareholder access, as 
implemented in the SEC’s 2010 Rule.  The difference between our result and earlier work may 
reflect different methodologies, and in particular the different events used.  Our view is that the 
October 4 announcement makes a particularly useful event for empirical work because it was 
both material and unexpected.   
Our results might be useful to shareholders in determining how to vote on proxy access 
proposals under the current regime.  In addition, because the D.C. Circuit did not reach the 
Business Roundtable’s constitutional challenges, it remains possible that the SEC might propose 
a new proxy access rule in the future.  Prior to the announcement of the D.C. Circuit’s decision, 
the New York Times observed that “the lack of empirical evidence at the time the S.E.C. made its 
decision will be an issue in the District of Columbia court case.”   Our results might contribute to 
addressing this perceived deficiency if the SEC were to return to the issue of proxy access in the 
future. 38 
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Figure 1.October 4 returns by institutional ownership decile  
 
The graphs show equal-weighted returns in basis points for firms in each decile of institutional ownership or  activist 
institutional ownership. 95% confidence intervals are plotted around each mean return, assuming independence.  
Returns outside of [-0.3, 0.3] are excluded. 
 
 
Panel A. Raw returns, institutional ownership deciles 
 
 
Panel B. Excess returns, institutional ownership deciles 
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Figure 2. October 4 intraday returns 
 
This graph shows cumulative returns relative to closing price on Friday, October 1, for 5 minute intervals throughout 
the trading day on October 4, in basis points. The return is calculated using trade-level data from Bloomberg. The 
dashed line shows the equal-weighted average return for S&P1500 firms for each period. The solid line shows the 
regression coefficient on activist ownership. The timing of key news events is indicated with shaded vertical lines. 
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Table 1. Institutional ownership 
 
This table summarizes the institutional ownership data for all firms in the S&P 1500 index. Returns outside of [-0.3, 
0.3] are excluded. Ownership data is based on June, 2010 13(f) filings. Panel A reports average ownership by decile. 
Panel B reports summary statistics for various measures of institutional ownership 
 
Panel A        
Decile  Institutional ownership 
(June 2010), mean 
Activist 
institutional 
ownership (June 
2010), mean 
Firms 
1  25.3% 0.05%  139 
2  37.9% 0.32%  138 
3  42.1% 0.77%  140 
4  45.4% 1.33%  139 
5  48.4% 1.98%  138 
6  51.0% 2.63%  139 
7  53.7% 3.57%  138 
8  56.9% 4.89%  139 
9  61.3% 7.40%  138 
10  69.6% 13.20%  139 
All  49.2%  3.60% 1,388 
 
 
Panel B          
Variable  Mean Std  dev  10th 
percentile  Median  90th 
percentile 
 
Observati
ons 
Institutional ownership, all  49.1% 12.6% 35.0% 49.8% 64.4% 1,388 
Institutional ownership, activists  3.6% 4.0% 0.1% 2.3% 9.1% 1,388 
Number of activist owners with at 
least 3%  0.32  0.57  0 0 1  1,388 
Highest activist stake  2.52% 3.10% 0.12% 1.40% 6.69% 1,388 
 43 
 
Table 2. Stock returns Monday, October 4, by institutional ownership 
 
This table reports stock returns for S&P1500 firms by institutional ownership or activist institutional ownership 
decile for Monday, October 4, 2010. Returns outside of [-0.3, 0.3] are excluded.  Return data is from Datastream, 
and measured in basis points. Excess return is the residual after regressing returns on betas from the Fama-French 
three factor model, with betas estimated over the first six months of 2010. Weighted average return is weighted by 
market capitalization using outstanding shares of the first quarter 2010, from CRSP. 
 
 
Decile  
Equal weighted 
return, all 
institutions 
Equal 
weighted 
excess return, 
all institutions  
Equal 
weighted 
excess return, 
activist owners 
Observations
Low  -95.4 12.5 -17.9  139 
2  -96.2 9.9 14.1  138 
3  -112.6 -6.3  47.1 140 
4  -108.2 2.0 -11.9  139 
5  -136.7 -26.7 -15.7 138 
6  -122.7 -11.3 -16.8 139 
7  -134.9 -23.3 -18.9 138 
8  -140.7 -23.8 -31.8 139 
9  -157.8 -37.6 -17.6 138 
High  -139.3 -24.4 -60.4 139 
Average  -124.4 -10.2 -12.9  1,388 
Difference: 10 - 1  -43.9 -36.9 -42.5   
Difference: 10/9 - 1/2  -52.8 -42.2 -37.1   44 
 
Table 3. Regressions of excess stock returns Monday, October 4 
 
The table reports regression of stock returns for October 4, on various controls. Return data is form Datastream, and measured in basis points. Returns outside of 
[-0.3, 0.3] are excluded.  Excess return is the residual after estimating a Fama-French three factor model. Columns (5) and (6) use weighted returns based on 
market capitalization, defined using outstanding shares of the first quarter 2010, from CRSP. Institutional ownership is measured in June 2010.  Standard errors 
allow for cross-sectional correlation. * = statistically significant at 90% confidence; ** = 95% confidence; *** = 99% confidence. 
 
 
Returns Raw,  EW  Excess, EW  Excess, VW 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Institutional ownership  -136.6*  -112.9*   -170.3   
  (72.7)  (60.7)   (112.6)   
        
Activist institutional 
ownership 
 -553.2***  -527.3***   -601.8* 
 (189.8)  (161.8)  (323.9) 
        
        
Constant  -57.3 -104.5  42.6**  6.1  -7.2  13.2 
  (168.4) (172.9)  (36.8)  (26.7)  (6.5)  (37.2) 
        
R-squared  0.010 0.020 0.006 0.018 0.006 0.004 
N  1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 
  
  45 
 
Table 4. Regressions of excess stock returns Monday, October 4 
 
This table reports regression of stock returns for October 4, on various controls. Return data is form Datastream, and measured in basis points. Returns outside of 
[-0.3, 0.3] are excluded. Excess return is the residual after estimating a Fama-French three factor model. Intercepts are included but not reported. Standard errors 
allow for cross-sectional correlation. * = statistically significant at 90% confidence; ** = 95% confidence; *** = 99% confidence. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Largest institutional stake  -110.3    
  (159.5)    
     
Largest institutional stake, activist   -642.3***  
   (220.5)  
     
Number of activist institutional owners 
above 3% 
   -32.9*** 
   (10.5) 
     
R-squared  0.001 0.017 0.015 
N  1,388 1,388 1,388 46 
 
Table 5. Regressions of excess stock returns Monday, October 4 on firm characteristics 
 
The table reports regression of stock returns for October 4, on various controls. Return data is form Datastream, and measured in basis points. Excess return is the 
residual after estimating a Fama-French three factor model. Returns outside of [-0.3, 0.3] are excluded. Only S&P 1500 firms are included. Institutional 
ownership is measured in June 2010.  Staggered board is a dummy equal to one if the board is classified. G-index is the governance index of Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003), based on 2006 (the last date for which the components are reported). Delaware incorporation is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is incorporated in 
Delaware. Board size is the log of the number of board members. Intercepts are included but not reported. Standard errors allow for cross-sectional correlation. * 
= statistically significant at 90% confidence; ** = 95% confidence; *** = 99% confidence. 
 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Activist institutional ownership  -526.8*** -461.1** -810.4*** -502.3*** 
  (159.5) (186.4) (241.4) (157.8) 
Staggered board dummy  -2.2       
  (12.6)     
G-index   0.2    
 (0.3)    
Delaware incorporation     -58.9***   
   (24.1)   
Delaware * Act. inst’l 
ownership 
   496.6*  
   (279.6)   
Board size      45.3 
    (41.3) 
R-squared  0.014 0.014 0.037 0.023 
N  1,388 1,075 1,373 1,373 
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Table 6.  Regressions of excess stock returns Monday, October 4: length of holdings 
 
The table reports regression of stock returns for October, 4, on various controls. Return data is form Datastream, and measured in basis points. Returns outside of 
[-0.3, 0.3] are excluded. Excess return is the residual after estimating a Fama-French three factor model.  Only S&P 1500 firms are included. Institutional 
ownership is measured for each of the twelve quarters ending in June 2010. Intercepts are included but not reported. Standard errors allow for cross-sectional 
correlation. * = statistically significant at 90% confidence; ** = 95% confidence; *** = 99% confidence. 
 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Institutional ownership  -112.9*       
(60.7)       
Institutional ownership, three year 
old positions only 
a   -172.5        
  (112.3)      
Institutional ownership, holding 
period weighted
  b 
   -198.6**     
   (89.5)     
Activist institutional ownership      -527.3***    
    (161.8)    
Activist institutional ownership, 
three year old positions only 
a       -735.6***   
     (276.0)   
Activist institutional ownership, 
holding period weighted
  b 
      -711.7*** 
      (229.7) 
R-squared  0.008 0.006 0.011 0.019 0.011 0.017 
N  1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 
 
 
a Measure of institutional ownership includes only positions held continuously for three years.   
b Measure of institutional ownership weights holdings according to duration continuously held: (1/12) weight for positions held for 1 quarter, (2/12) weight for 
positions held for 2 quarters, up to (12/12) weight for positions continuously held for three years.   48 
 
Table 7.  Regressions of excess stock returns Monday, October 4: by subsamples of industry-adjusted performance 
 
The table reports regression of stock returns for October, 4, on various controls. Return data is form Datastream, and measured in basis points. Returns outside of 
[-0.3, 0.3] are excluded. Excess return is the residual after estimating a Fama - French three factor model.  Only S&P 1500 firms are included. Institutional 
ownership is measured in June 2010. All performance is measured relative to the mean for the Fama-French (48) industry to which the firm belongs. The cut-off 
between “HIGH” and “LOW” is zero. Intercepts are included but not reported. Standard errors allow for cross-sectional correlation. * = statistically significant at 
90% confidence; ** = 95% confidence; *** = 99% confidence. 
 
 
 
2007-2009 
stock return is 
LOW 
2007-2009 
stock return is 
HIGH 
Book-to-
market is 
HIGH 
Book-to-
market is 
LOW 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Activist institutional ownership  -682.1** -463.0**  -172.6  -442.0*** 
(277.0) (176.0) (308.7) (167.2) 
      
      
R-squared  0.025 0.018 0.025 0.013 
N  432 909 264  1,096 
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Table 8. Regressions of excess stock returns July 22, 2011 
 
The table reports regression of stock returns for July 22, on various controls. Return data is form Datastream, and measured in basis points. Returns outside of [-
0.15, 0.15] are excluded.  Excess return is the residual after estimating a Fama-French three factor model. Column (3) uses weighted returns based on Market 
capitalization, defined using outstanding shares of the first quarter 2010, from CRSP. Institutional ownership is measured in June 2010.  Intercepts are included 
but not reported. Standard errors allow for cross-sectional correlation. * = statistically significant at 90% confidence; ** = 95% confidence; *** = 99% 
confidence. 
 
 
Returns  Raw, EW  Excess, EW  Excess, VW 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Activist institutional ownership  -490.7*** -463.3***  -667.0** 
  (139.6) (128.6)  (317.9) 
      
      
      
R-squared  0.009 0.008  0.011 
N  1,389 1,389  1,389 
  
 